Proof-theoretic Semantics for Classical Propositional Logic with Assertion and Denial

The field of proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) offers an alternative approach to meaning in logic that is based on inference and argument (rather than truth in a model). It has been successfully developed for various logics; in particular, Sandqvist has developed such semantics for both classical and intuitionistic logic. In the case of classical logic, P-tS provides a conception of consequence that avoids an \emph{a priori} commitment to the principle of bivalence, addressing what Dummett identified as a significant foundational challenge in logic. In this paper, we propose an alternative P-tS for classical logic, which essentially extends the P-tS for intuitionistic logic by operating over literals rather than atomic propositions. Importantly, literals are atomic and not defined by negation but are defined by inferential relationships. This semantics illustrates the perspective that classical logic can be understood as intuitionistic logic supplemented by a principle of duality, offering fresh insights into the relationship between these two systems.