Controlling a Social Network of Individuals with Coevolving Actions and Opinions
By: Roberta Raineri, Mengbin Ye, Lorenzo Zino
Potential Business Impact:
Changes minds by adding stubborn people.
In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who have actions and opinions, which coevolve, mutually influencing one another on a complex network structure. In particular, we formulate a control problem for this social network, in which we assume that we can inject into the network a committed minority -- a set of stubborn nodes -- with the objective of steering the population, initially at a consensus, to a different consensus state. Our study focuses on two main objectives: i) determining the conditions under which the committed minority succeeds in its goal, and ii) identifying the optimal placement for such a committed minority. After deriving general monotone convergence result for the controlled dynamics, we leverage these results to build a computationally-efficient algorithm to solve the first problem and an effective heuristics for the second problem, which we prove to be NP-complete. For both algorithms, we establish theoretical guarantees. The proposed methodology is illustrated though academic examples, and demonstrated on a real-world case study.
Similar Papers
Coevolution of Actions and Opinions in Networks of Coordinating and Anti-Coordinating Agents
CS and Game Theory
Helps groups agree or disagree on things.
Optimal Policy Design for Repeated Decision-Making under Social Influence
Systems and Control
Guides people to make better choices together.
Steering Opinion Dynamics in Signed Time-Varying Networks via External Control Input
Systems and Control
Changes how groups think to reach any goal.