Propagational Proxy Voting
By: Yasushi Sakai , Parfait Atchade-Adelomou , Ryan Jiang and more
Potential Business Impact:
Lets groups vote more fairly on choices.
This paper proposes a voting process in which voters allocate fractional votes to their expected utility in different domains: over proposals, other participants, and sets containing proposals and participants. This approach allows for a more nuanced expression of preferences by calculating the result and relevance within each node. We modeled this by creating a voting matrix that reflects their preference. We use absorbing Markov chains to gain the consensus, and also calculate the influence within the participating nodes. We illustrate this method in action through an experiment with 69 students using a budget allocation topic.
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