Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics
By: Azhar Iqbal , Ishan Honhaga , Eyoel Teffera and more
Potential Business Impact:
Drones and tanks play a strategic war game.
This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one using advanced drones for attack, and the other defending using tanks. The paper conceptualizes this as a sequential game, illustrating the complex strategic dynamics similar to Stackelberg competition, where moves and countermoves are carefully analyzed and predicted.
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