Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting
By: Piotr Faliszewski , Łukasz Janeczko , Andrzej Kaczmarczyk and more
Potential Business Impact:
Helps voters pick the best projects fairly.
We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the total cost of those that get funded. We focus on finding conditions under which pure Nash equilibria (NE) exist in our games, and on the complexity of checking whether they exist. We also seek algorithms for computing best responses for the proposers
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