Almost and Approximate EFX for Few Types of Agents
By: Vishwa Prakash HV, Ruta Mehta, Prajakta Nimbhorkar
Potential Business Impact:
Divides items fairly among people with different tastes.
We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with $k$ distinct additive valuations, with the goal of achieving approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha-\mathrm{EFX}$). It is known that EFX allocations exist for $n$ agents when there are at most three distinct valuations due to HV et al. Furthermore, Amanatidis et al. showed that a $\frac{2}{3}-\mathrm{EFX}$ allocation is guaranteed to exist when number of agents is at most seven. In this paper, we show that a $\frac{2}{3}-\mathrm{EFX}$ allocation exists for any number of agents when there are at most four distinct valuations. Secondly, we consider a relaxation called $\mathrm{EFX}$ with charity, where some goods remain unallocated such that no agent envies the set of unallocated goods. Akrami et al. showed that for $n$ agents and any $\varepsilon \in \left(0, \frac{1}{2}\right]$, there exists a $(1-\varepsilon)-\mathrm{EFX}$ allocation with at most $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}((n/\varepsilon)^{\frac{1}{2}})$ goods to charity. In this paper, we show that a $(1-\varepsilon)-\mathrm{EFX}$ allocation with a $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(k/\varepsilon)^{\frac{1}{2}}$ charity exists for any number of agents when there are at most $k$ distinct valuations.
Similar Papers
Existence of 2-EFX Allocations of Chores
CS and Game Theory
Divides chores fairly, even when unfairness is small.
Computing Envy-Free up to Any Good (EFX) Allocations via Local Search
CS and Game Theory
Finds fair ways to share items.
Online EFX Allocations with Predictions
CS and Game Theory
Makes sharing items fair, even with bad guesses.