Distributionally Robust Equilibria over the Wasserstein Distance for Generalized Nash Game
By: Yixun Wen, Yulong Gao, Boli Chen
Potential Business Impact:
Helps many people make fair decisions with unknowns.
Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is fundamental for practical applications where multiple self-interested agents work together to make optimal decisions. In this work, we study GNEP with shared distributionally robust chance constraints (DRCCs) for incorporating inevitable uncertainties. The DRCCs are defined over the Wasserstein ball, which can be explicitly characterized even with limited sample data. To determine the equilibrium of the GNEP, we propose an exact approach to transform the original computationally intractable problem into a deterministic formulation using the Nikaido-Isoda function. Specifically, we show that when all agents' objectives are quadratic in their respective variables, the equilibrium can be obtained by solving a typical mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem, where the integer and continuous variables are decoupled in both the objective function and the constraints. This structure significantly improves computational tractability, as demonstrated through a case study on the charging station pricing problem.
Similar Papers
Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium Seeking with Heterogeneous Data: A Lagrangian Approach
Optimization and Control
Helps computers learn fair decisions even with uncertain information.
System-Theoretic Analysis of Dynamic Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems -- Turnpikes and Dissipativity
Systems and Control
Makes smart systems work together better.
Robustly Constrained Dynamic Games for Uncertain Nonlinear Dynamics
Systems and Control
Robots avoid crashing, even with bad information.