A Small Collusion is All You Need
By: Yotam Gafni
Potential Business Impact:
Makes blockchain fair even with cheating.
Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory. \cite{chung2023foundations} introduce the notion of a mechanism being $c$-Side-Contract-Proof ($c$-SCP), i.e., robust to a collusion of the miner and $c$ users. Later work \cite{chung2024collusion,welfareIncreasingCollusion} shows a gap between the $1$-SCP and $2$-SCP classes. We show that the class of $2$-SCP mechanisms equals that of any $c$-SCP with $c\geq 2$, under a relatively minor assumption of consistent tie-breaking. In essence, this implies that any mechanism vulnerable to collusion, is also vulnerable to a small collusion.
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