On Minimal Achievable Quotas in Multiwinner Voting
By: Patrick Becker, Fabian Frank
Potential Business Impact:
Makes voting fairer by changing rules for each election.
Justified representation (JR) and extended justified representation (EJR) are well-established proportionality axioms in approval-based multiwinner voting. Both axioms are always satisfiable, but they rely on a fixed quota (typically Hare or Droop), with the Droop quota being the smallest one that guarantees existence across all instances. With this observation in mind, we take a first step beyond the fixed-quota paradigm and introduce proportionality notions where the quota is instance-dependent. We demonstrate that all commonly studied voting rules can have an additive distance to the optimum of $\frac{k^2}{(k+1)^2}$. Moreover, we look into the computational aspects of our instance-dependent quota and prove that determining the optimal value of $\alpha$ for a given approval profile satisfying $\alpha$-JR is NP-complete. To address this, we introduce an integer linear programming (ILP) formulation for computing committees that satisfy $\alpha$-JR, and we provide positive results in the voter interval (VI) and candidate interval (CI) domains.
Similar Papers
Justified Representation: From Hare to Droop
CS and Game Theory
Helps groups get fair representation in elections.
Multiwinner Voting with Interval Preferences under Incomplete Information
CS and Game Theory
Helps pick fair election winners with fewer questions.
Likelihood of the Existence of Average Justified Representation
CS and Game Theory
Ensures fair election winners for voter groups.