Designing Non-monetary Intersection Control Mechanisms for Efficient Selfish Routing
By: Yusuf Saltan , Jyun-Jhe Wang , Arda Kosay and more
Potential Business Impact:
Fixes traffic jams by changing when cars go.
Urban traffic congestion stems from the misalignment between self-interested routing decisions and socially optimal flows. Intersections, as critical bottlenecks, amplify these inefficiencies because existing control schemes often neglect drivers' strategic behavior. Autonomous intersections, enabled by vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, permit vehicle-level scheduling based on individual requests. Leveraging this fine-grained control, we propose a non-monetary mechanism that strategically adjusts request timestamps-delaying or advancing passage times-to incentivize socially efficient routing. We present a hierarchical architecture separating local scheduling by roadside units from network-wide timestamp adjustments by a central planner. We establish an experimentally validated analytical model, prove the existence and essential uniqueness of equilibrium flows and formulate the planner's problem as an offline bilevel optimization program solvable with standard tools. Experiments on the Sioux Falls network show up to a 68% reduction in the efficiency gap between equilibrium and optimal flows, demonstrating scalability and effectiveness.
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