ε-Optimally Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum POSGs
By: Erwan Christian Escudie , Matthia Sabatelli , Olivier Buffet and more
Potential Business Impact:
Lets computers play games they can't fully see.
We present a novel framework for ε-optimally solving two-player zero-sum partially observable stochastic games (zs-POSGs). These games pose a major challenge due to the absence of a principled connection with dynamic programming (DP) techniques developed for two-player zero-sum stochastic games (zs-SGs). Prior attempts at transferring solution methods have lacked a lossless reduction, defined here as a transformation that preserves value functions, equilibrium strategies, and optimality structure, thereby limiting generalisation to ad-hoc algorithms. This work introduces the first lossless reduction from zs-POSGs to transition-independent zs-SGs, enabling the principled application of a broad class of DP-based methods. We show empirically that point-based value iteration (PBVI) algorithms, applied via this reduction, produce ε-optimal strategies across a range of benchmark domains, consistently matching or outperforming existing state-of-the-art methods. Our results open a systematic pathway for algorithmic and theoretical transfer from SGs to partially observable settings.
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