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Positional queuetions
Published: December 12, 2025 |
arXiv ID: 2512.11185v1
By: Vladimir Yankovskiy
In this work, we consider properties of VCG and GSP positional auctions in queues. The work is a continuation of "Position Auctions for Sponsored Search in Marketplaces" by the same author.
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