Learning-Augmented Facility Location Mechanisms for the Envy Ratio Objective
By: Haris Aziz , Yuhang Guo , Alexander Lam and more
The augmentation of algorithms with predictions of the optimal solution, such as from a machine-learning algorithm, has garnered significant attention in recent years, particularly in facility location problems. Moving beyond the traditional focus on utilitarian and egalitarian objectives, we design learning-augmented facility location mechanisms on a line for the envy ratio objective, a fairness metric defined as the maximum ratio between the utilities of any two agents. For the deterministic setting, we propose a mechanism which utilizes predictions to achieve $α$-consistency and $\fracα{α- 1}$-robustness for a selected parameter $α\in [1,2]$, and prove its optimality. We also resolve open questions raised by Ding et al. [10], devising a randomized mechanism without predictions to improve upon the best-known approximation ratio from $2$ to $1.8944$. Building upon these advancements, we construct a novel randomized mechanism which incorporates predictions to achieve improved performance guarantees.
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