Sequential Apportionment from Stationary Divisor Methods
By: Michael A. Jones, Brittany Ohlinger, Jennifer Wilson
Potential Business Impact:
Makes voting fairer by ordering seat choices.
Divisor methods are well known to satisfy house monotonicity, which allows representative seats to be allocated sequentially. We focus on stationary divisor methods defined by a rounding cut point $c \in [0,1]$. For such methods with integer-valued votes, the resulting apportionment sequences are periodic. Restricting attention to two-party allocations, we characterize the set of possible sequences and establish a connection between the lexicographical ordering of these sequences and the parameter $c$. We then show how sequences for all pairs of parties can be systematically extended to the $n$-party setting. Further, we determine the number of distinct sequences in the $n$-party problem for all $c$. Our approach offers a refined perspective on large-party bias: rather than viewing large parties as simply receiving more seats, we show that they instead obtain their seats earlier in the apportionment sequence. Of particular interest is a new relationship we uncover between the sequences generated by the smallest divisors (Adams) and greatest divisors (d'Hondt or Jefferson) methods.
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